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A central question for understanding ﬁnancial intermediation is whether investors merely
allocate funds, or whether they also play an active role in the companies they ﬁnance.
T h em o d e r nl i t e r a t u r eo nﬁnancial intermediation has identiﬁed several dimensions of
active involvement, such as monitoring, corporate governance, as well as a number of
information-based advice and support services (see Boot (2000), Fama (1985), Petersen
and Rajan (1994, 1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Stiglitz (1985) among others).
There is also a widespread belief that active ﬁnancial intermediation positively aﬀects the
behavior of portfolio companies (Hart (1995, 2001)). Recent empirical evidence supports
the notion that active investors are valuable to the companies they ﬁnance, providing
monitoring and governance which results in better performance (Anderson et al. (2003),
Cremers and Nair (2004), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Qiu (2003)).
In this paper we ask what makes some ﬁnancial intermediaries more active and involved
with the companies they ﬁnance than others. We submit that specialization is a key driver
of investor involvement. Ever since Adam Smith, economists emphasize specialization as
a driver of economic transactions. We build on this fundamental concept and ask if
specialization can help us better understand the nature of ﬁnancial intermediation. More
speciﬁcally, we look at whether more focussed and specialized intermediaries become more
involved with the companies they ﬁnance. We look at two dimensions of specialization.
First, we consider specialization at the level of the organization. Second, we consider that
ﬁnancial intermediation is performed by people and look at specialization at the level of
human capital. We also look at the interaction of these two levels of specialization, and
ask whether the decision to be active resides at the level of the organization or whether it
is individuals within the ﬁnancial intermediaries who drive this choice.
Recent theories of ﬁnancial intermediation emphasize the role of organizational struc-
ture. Stein (2002), in particular, shows how organizational structure aﬀects the processing
of ’soft’ information, which he argues is at the core of ﬁnancial intermediation. Empiri-
cally, the recent work of Berger et al. (2004), and Liberti (2003) also points to the role
of organizational structure for ﬁnancial intermediation. We build on this line of thought
and ask how specialization of a ﬁnancial intermediary–both in terms of organization and
human capital–aﬀects its involvement with the companies it ﬁnances.
Our analysis focuses on one important form of ﬁnancial intermediation, venture capi-
tal. Venture capital has become an important part of the ﬁnancial system, having grown
enormously both in the US and globally (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002, 2004), Gompers and
Lerner (1999a), Lerner and Schoar (2004), Megginson (2004)). Central to our analysis
is that venture capital is a form of ﬁnancial intermediation where investors can choose
how much to become involved with their portfolio companies. Indeed, prior research has
already documented that there is considerable scope for active investing in venture capital.
Active venture investors can help their portfolio companies in many ways, including giving
advice and support, helping with professionalizing the management team, creating strate-
gic alliances, or exercising corporate governance (Gompers (1995), Hellmann and Puri
(2002), Hochberg (2004), Hsu (2004), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004), Lerner (1994),
Lindsey (2003)). Venture capitalists can also spur their companies’ innovation (Hellmann
and Puri (2000), Lerner and Kortum (2000)). However, not all venture capital ﬁrms are
1alike. Using the industry’s language, some are “hands-on,” while others are “hands-oﬀ”
investors. We ask what explains this heterogeneity in venture capital investment styles.
We base our analysis on a hand-collected dataset of European venture capital invest-
ments. The data covers the period 1998-2001, and consists of a sample of venture capital
deals in all the members of the European Union (in the period under study), plus Norway
and Switzerland. Our primary data source is a comprehensive survey of all the venture
capital ﬁrms in these countries. We augmented the data with numerous secondary sources,
including commercial databases and websites. The relevant data for this paper consist of
over 120 venture capital ﬁrms, over 500 partners, and over 1,600 portfolio companies. The
data collection required considerable time and eﬀort, but resulted in a dataset that is
signiﬁcantly larger than other hand-collected datasets on venture capital, and much richer
than the commercially available datasets.
The extent of active investor involvement cannot be ascertained from standard sources
of venture capital data (such as VenturExpert), nor can it be deduced from venture capital
contracts. A unique strength of our survey-based approach is that it allows us to compile
a variety of measures for active investor involvement. We obtain data on the frequency
of interaction with a portfolio ﬁrm, the exercise of corporate governance, the support for
recruiting management, and any assistance in obtaining additional ﬁnancing.
Another advantage of our data is that we are able to construct several measures of
specialization, both for the intermediary, and for its individual partners. In terms of
specialization at the organizational level, we have a variety of measures, such as whether a
venture capital ﬁrm is an independent partnership or not, whether it invest only in venture
capital, or how many companies it ﬁnances per partner. We also have detailed data on
individual partners’ background, that allow us to document the relevance of human capital
for ﬁnancial intermediation. We measure human capital along three diﬀerent dimensions:
a partner’s accumulated experience as venture capitalist, a partner’s previous business
experience, and a partner’s scientiﬁc education. We construct both the average human
capital for the venture ﬁrm as a whole, and the human capital proﬁle of the individual
partner (or partners) responsible for speciﬁcd e a l s .
We ﬁnd three main results, that are strikingly consistent across our measures of in-
volvement. First, we ﬁnd that an active investment style is strongly related to a ﬁnancial
intermediary’s organizational specialization. Independent venture capital ﬁrms are sig-
niﬁcantly more likely to get involved with their companies. The same is true for ﬁrms
that specialize their investment activities to doing only venture capital deals and for ﬁrms
which concentrate on relatively few deals per partner. Second, beyond specialization at
the organizational level, we ﬁnd that human capital is also associated with a more active
investment style. In particular, venture capitalists with prior business experience are sig-
niﬁcantly more involved with the companies they ﬁnance. Our third result comes from
looking at the interaction between these two dimensions of specialization. We ﬁnd that
human capital augments, rather than replacing, organizational characteristics. Moreover,
human capital eﬀects operate mainly at the level of the venture ﬁrm, so that variation
in human capital across venture ﬁrms has more explanatory power than variation among
partners within the same ﬁrm.
We further reﬁne these results in a series of extensions. Among other things, we
2document that the role a venture ﬁrm plays in deal syndication is important: ﬁrms which
lead a syndicate are more active than passive participants. Still, our main results on the
importance of specialization are not aﬀected by the inclusion of syndication variables. We
also perform several robustness checks, including tests for endogeneity, sample selection,
and a variety of measurement issues, and consistently ﬁnd that the main results continue
to hold.
We believe that our results provide new insights into the nature of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation. The recent literature suggests that the organizational structure of ﬁnancial
intermediaries matters. Our analysis not only empirically conﬁrms the importance of
organizational structure, it also pushes the argument one step further. If ﬁnancial inter-
mediation is about individuals processing soft information, as suggested by Stein (2002),
then organizational structure can explain some variation, but some of the variation will
also come from the individuals who process the information. That is, once we put the
processing of soft information at the center stage of ﬁnancial intermediation, we cannot
escape the fact that the human capital of those in charge might matter. Our results
conﬁrm the importance of human capital for the process of intermediation. This poses a
challenge to the prevalent theories of ﬁnancial intermediation, which eﬀectively ignore the
role of human capital.
By introducing the role of human capital into ﬁnancial intermediation, our work also
relates to recent advances in understanding how individuals may aﬀect corporate policies
more broadly. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Malmendier and Tate (2003), for example,
provide evidence that managerial characteristics aﬀect corporate decision making.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our data. Section 3 examines
the role of specialization at the organizational level. Section 4 looks at the role of human
capital. Section 5 considers several extensions. Section 6 discusses numerous robustness
checks. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
2T h e D a t a
In this Section we discuss the sources and nature of our data. Before doing so, we wish
to stress the advantages of using European data. The European venture capital market
has matured considerably throughout the 1990s, growing in size and in its ability to
invest in innovative companies with a potential for high-growth (Bottazzi and Da Rin
(2002), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2004)). The European market is also more
heterogenous and less institutionalized than the US market, thus harboring a greater
variety of venture capital ﬁrms that vary in terms of their organizational structure and
human capital attributes. Therefore, it provides a fertile ground to study diﬀerences in
investment styles, and thus to understand the eﬀects of organizational specialization and
human capital on ﬁnancial intermediation.
2.1 Sources of data
Our data come from a variety of sources. Our primary source is a survey that we sent to
750 venture capital ﬁrms in the following seventeen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
3Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. This set of countries includes all the
members of the European Union in the period under study, plus Norway and Switzerland.
We contacted venture ﬁrms that satisﬁed three conditions: (i) in 2001 they were full
members of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national venture
capital organization, (ii) they were actively engaged in venture capital and (iii) they were
still in operations in 2002.
We deliberately excluded private equity ﬁrms that only engage in non-venture private
equity deals such as mezzanine ﬁnance, management buy-outs (MBOs) or leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs).1 However, we did include private equity ﬁr m st h a ti n v e s ti nboth venture
capital and non-venture private equity deals. For these, we considered only their venture
capital investments.
We collected our survey data between February 2002 and November 2003. We asked
venture capital ﬁrms about the investments they made between January 1998 and De-
cember 2001. The questions centered on key characteristics of the venture ﬁrm, on the
involvement with portfolio companies, and on some characteristics of these companies.2
The survey asked respondents a substantial amount of detailed company-level information.
We also asked information on the educational background and work experience of each
venture partner.
We received 127 responses with various degrees of completeness. Of these, three ven-
ture ﬁrms had been formed in 2001 but had not yet made any investments, so we do not
include them in our sample. We contacted all the venture ﬁrms that had sent us incomplete
answers, and attempted to complete them whenever possible. As a further step, we aug-
mented the survey data with information from the websites of the respondents and their
portfolio companies. Finally, we turned to commercially available databases: Amadeus,
Diane, Worldscope, and VenturExpert. We use information from these databases for two
purposes. First, they allow us to obtain missing information, such as the dates, stages,
and amounts of venture deals. Second, we use these databases to cross-check the informa-
tion obtained from respondents. Such cross-validation further enhances the reliability of
our data. Overall, we obtain data on 124 venture ﬁrms, 518 venture partners and 1,656
portfolio companies. Notice that we collect data only on the ﬁrst ﬁnancing given by a
venture capital ﬁrm to a portfolio company.
Because of the survey nature of our data, we perform a variety of checks to assess
how well the sample represents the population of European venture capital ﬁrms. Our
ﬁrst concern is how the sample fares in spanning the underlying population. Table 1
compares the sample with the population of 750 venture capital ﬁrms. Panel A looks at
the country composition. While there is some variation in response rates across countries,
our data represent a comprehensive cross-section which provides a good coverage of all
countries. The overall response rate of over 16% is quite remarkable, and provides us
with a substantial amount of information. This means that our sample is signiﬁcantly
larger than any prior survey of the European–or even US–venture capital industry. No
single country dominates the sample, and no country is left out. Most notably, our sample
1See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (2003) for a discussion of how the venture capital market is structure in
two diﬀerent segments, ’venture capital’ and ’non-venture private equity.’
2Throughout the paper we reserve the term ’ﬁrm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital ﬁrm) and
the term ’company’ to the company that receives the venture capital ﬁnancing.
4performs well in terms of including ﬁrms from the larger venture capital markets: France,
Germany, and the UK all have response rates above 13%.
As a second step, we believe it is useful to show how our sample properties compare to
the population characteristics. For this we made a substantial additional eﬀort to collect
data for all the 750 European venture capital ﬁrms, including those that did not respond
to our survey. Unlike banks, venture capital ﬁrms are not regulated and do not need to
fulﬁl any disclosure requirement. It is therefore left to their discretion whether to provide
us with the requested information, and venture ﬁrms are notoriously secretive. Still, we
were able to gather information on between two thirds and the whole of the population,
depending on the dimension considered. We obtained the information through direct
contact and through websites, commercial databases, or trade publications.
Panel B looks at the structure of both sample and population in terms of organizational
types. We partition the sample into independent, bank, corporate, and public venture
capital ﬁrms. As we argue later in the paper, diﬀerent types of venture ﬁrms are likely to
behave diﬀe r e n t l y ,a n dw ew a n tt om a k es u r et h a to u rr e s u l t sa r en o td r i v e nb yt h es a m p l e
composition. Panel B clearly shows that our sample reﬂects very closely the distribution
of types in the population. The only possible exception is public venture ﬁrms, where our
sample slightly under-represents the population. We therefore caution that our data is
not ideally suited for generalizing about public venture capital ﬁrms.
Panel C compares the size distribution of our respondents with that of the whole
population. We consider two possible size measures: the number of partners, and the
amount of funds under management, both measured at the end of 2001. The number
of partners is a simple and useful size measure for this form of ﬁnancial intermediation,
which crucially depends on a few high-quality professionals. For the sample and the
population both the mean and median values of partners virtually coincide. The amount
under management comprises all funds managed by venture capital ﬁrms, including those
invested in non-venture private equity. The average ﬁrms size is larger for the population.
This diﬀerence stems mainly from several very large private equity ﬁrms, that invest mainly
in non-venture private equity, and that chose not to respond to our survey.Consistent with
this, the median ﬁrm size is very similar for the sample and the population.
Another notable strength of our data is that it does not rely on a few venture capital
ﬁrms. Indeed, the largest venture capital ﬁrm accounts for only 5% of the observations,
and the largest 5 venture capital ﬁrms for only 16% of the observations.
Finally, we consider a potentially important source of reporting bias. Our respondents
m a yi nf a c tc h o o s et or e p o r to n l yp a r to ft h e i rp o r t f o l i o . S i n c ew ea r en o ta s k i n ga n y
information related to performance, we are not particularly worried that we obtain infor-
mation biased towards more successful companies. Still, one may wonder that the detailed
information we ask may result in under-reporting across the board. To check whether this
is true, in late 2003 we checked all the websites of the respondents, listing all the portfolio
companies contained. If a reporting bias was present, we would ﬁnd a larger number of
companies than had been reported. This turns out not to be the case. When we exclude
the 137 portfolio companies of the 15 respondents that do not list companies in their web-
site, we ﬁnd 1,675 companies on respondents’ websites. This compares to 1,519 companies
from our sample. The diﬀerence of 156 companies amounts to just 10% of the companies
5reported. We conclude that it is unlikely that under-reporting aﬀects our results.
2.2 Data variables
Table 2 summarizes the deﬁnitions of our variables. In this Section we discuss how we
construct them. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the
analysis, grouped into four classes: dependent variables, organizational variables, human
capital variables, and company variables.
2.2.1 Dependent variables
Our dependent variables are constructed at the level of the portfolio company. They
capture ﬁve diﬀerent aspects of the involvement of venture capital ﬁr m sw i t he a c hp o r t f o l i o
company:
INTERACTION is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
is reported to interact with the company on a monthly or weekly basis; 0 if it interacts
with on an annual or quarterly basis. We obtain the data from our survey instrument,
which asked: How many times per year does (did) the responsible partner(s)/manager(s)
personally interact with this company? (check one). Possible answers were: annually;
quarterly; monthly; weekly.
BOARD SEAT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm is
reported to sit or have sat on the board of directors of the company; 0 otherwise. We obtain
the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Is (or was) your ﬁrm represented on
this company’s board of directors? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
HIRE DIRECTORS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital
ﬁrm is reported to be involved in the hiring of outside directors of the company; 0 other-
wise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Has your ﬁrm been
involved in hiring some of this company’s outside directors? Possible answers were: Yes,
No.
RECRUITING is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
is reported to be involved in recruiting senior management for the company; 0 otherwise.
We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Has your ﬁrm been involved
in recruiting senior management for this company? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
C E O ,C F O ,V PM A R K E T ,H E A DO FR & D ,O T H E Ra r eas e to fﬁve dummy variables
that take the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm is reported to be involved in recruiting
the Chief Executive Oﬃc e r( C E O ) ,t h eC h i e fF i n a n c i a lo ﬃcer (CFO), a vice president
of marketing, or the head of R&D, or another executive, respectively; 0 otherwise. We
obtain the data from our survey instrument, as a direct follow-up on the RECRUITING
question, asking: If Yes, whom? (multiple choices allowed). Possible answers were: CEO;
CFO; Vice President for marketing; Director of R&D; and other (specify).3
FUNDRAISING is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
is reported to be help the company obtain additional ﬁnancing; 0 otherwise. We obtain
3We obtained 109 responses which indicated other management positions, ranging from Chief Operating
Oﬃcer to Head of IT services.
6the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Has your ﬁrm helped this company
obtain additional ﬁnancing? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
2.2.2 Organizational variables
The following variables are constructed at the level of the venture capital ﬁrm:
INDEPENDENTVC, BANKVC, CORPORATEVC and PUBLICVC are four dummy
variables that take the value 1 if the venture capitalist deﬁnes itself as an independent,
bank, corporate or public venture capital ﬁrm; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our
survey instrument, which asked: Would you deﬁne your ﬁrm as (check one): Independent
venture ﬁrm, Corporate venture ﬁrm, Bank aﬃliated venture ﬁrm or Other (specify).4
VCSIZE is the amount under management of the venture capital ﬁrm at the end of
the sample period, in millions of current euros. We obtain the data by contacting directly
respondent companies after receiving their main answers. For those ﬁrms for which we had
not received the information directly we gathered the data from commercial databases,
company websites and industry sources.
VCAGE is the age of the venture capital ﬁrm, measured in months at the end of the
sample period. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Indicate the
date of creation of your ﬁrm (mm/yy). For those ﬁrms for which we had not received the
information directly we gathered the data from commercial databases, company websites
and industry sources.
MARKET FOCUS is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
is reported to engage only in venture capital deals (i.e., excluding other private equity deals
like MBOs or LBOs); 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Does your ﬁrm invest in non-venture private equity deals such as management
buy-outs (MBOs)? Possible answers were: Yes, No.
DEAL FOCUS is a variable given by the inverse of the average number of companies
ﬁnanced, per partner, per year. We obtain the data to compute this ratio from two
separate questions of our survey instrument. The ﬁrst question asked: Indicate how many
business plans has your ﬁrm ﬁnanced for each of the following years: 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001. The second question asked: Indicate the number of all partners/senior managers
active as of December 2001.5
2.2.3 Human capital variables
In our survey we asked: Identify anonymously all partners/senior managers active as of
December 2001. On the basis of this information we can measure human capital proﬁles
at two distinct levels. First, we construct them at the level of the venture ﬁrm. For this
we consider the average human capital proﬁle of the venture ﬁrm. This means that we
4 We carefully examined the three respondents which checked the ’other ’ category. One is a public
university fund, and was classiﬁed as public; another is a family-controlled fund, and was classiﬁed as
independent; the third is a fund owned by a a government company which engages in ﬁnancing for small
businesses, and was classiﬁed as public.
5In our survey instrument we speciﬁed that: a partner or senior manager is a person with investment
decision power within your ﬁrm, i.e. somebody who can decide whether to fund or not a company.
7measure the human capital of each partner, and then take the average across all partners
within the ﬁrm. This leads to the following variables:
VENTURE-EXPERIENCE is the average number of years of experience in venture
capital. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked (for each part-
ner/senior manager): Indicate the years of experience as venture capitalist.
BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE is the fraction of partners which have prior business experi-
ence. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked (for each partner/senior
manager): Indicate the professional background (multiple answers possible). Possible an-
swers were: ﬁnance; industry (including previous entrepreneurial experience); accounting;
c o n s u l t i n g ;l e g a l ;o t h e r( s p e c i f y ) .
SCIENCE-EDUCATION is the fraction of partners which have an education in science
or engineering. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked (for each
partner/senior manager): Indicate the professional background (multiple answers possible).
Possible answers were: business; humanities; engineering/science; law and social sciences;
other (specify).
Second, we construct human capital proﬁles at the level of the single portfolio company.
For this we consider only the partner (or partners, if there is more than one) in charge of a
deal. We obtain this data from an additional question from our survey instrument, which
asked (for each company): Which partner(s)/senior manager(s) has/had responsibility
for monitoring this company? Since the variables at the ﬁrm and company level are
(by construction) correlated, we focus on the additional information provided by the fact
that a particular deal was made by a particular partners. For this we take the human
capital proﬁle of the partners-in-charge, and subtract the average human capital proﬁle
of the ﬁrm. We indicate the resulting variables with: P-VENTURE-EXPERIENCE, P-
BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE, P-SCIENCE-EDUCATION.
2.2.4 Company variables
Finally, we construct two independent variables at the level of the portfolio company:6
INDUSTRY is set of a dummy variables that we obtain the data from our survey
instrument, which gave the following choices: Biotech and pharma; Medical products;
Software and internet; Financial services; Industrial services; Electronics; Consumer ser-
vices; Telecom; Food and consumer goods; Industrial products (incl. energy); Media &
Entertainment; Other (specify).
EARLY STAGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a deal is reported as seed
or start-up; 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked:
Indicate the type of your ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing to this company (check one). Possible
answers were: Seed; Start-up; Expansion; and Bridge.
6For companies for which we had not received information directly from respondents, we gathered
additional data from commercial databases, company websites and industry sources.
83 Specialization at the organizational level
We begin our analysis by asking how the specialization of an investor at the organizational
level aﬀects its involvement with the companies it ﬁnances. We already discussed the data
construction of our variables. To motivate our empirical analysis, we now turn to their
economic signiﬁcance.
3.1 Motivating the dependent variables
Hellmann and Puri (2002) show that, beyond monitoring, venture capitalists actively
support and professionalize the companies they ﬁnance. Our dependent variables thus
capture how much venture capital ﬁrms get involved with their companies. The strength
of using hand-collected survey data is that it provides us with a variety of involvement
measures that are otherwise not available. These measures allow us to capture a broad
array of governance and support activities.
The theoretical work of Casamatta (2003), Hellmann (2004), Inderst and Müller (2004),
Repullo and Suarez (2004), Schiendele (2004), and Schmidt (2003) emphasizes the impor-
tance of venture capital eﬀort, within a double moral hazard setting. Our ﬁrst dependent
variable is a summary measure of the intensity of interaction, measuring the reported fre-
quency with which an investor interacts with the company. This variable can be broadly
thought of as a proxy for the eﬀort level provided by the venture investor.
The theoretical importance of board seats and governance in venture capital is de-
veloped by Dessein (2004), Gompers (1995), and Hellmann (1998). Gompers and Lerner
(1996), Hochberg (2004), Lerner (1995) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) provide sup-
porting empirical evidence. For our second dependent variable we then ask whether an
investor sits on the boards of directors, which is a standard measure of corporate gover-
nance. Our third dependent variable is a complementary measure of how much the venture
capital ﬁrm plays an active role in providing governance. We ask whether an investor helps
portfolio companies to hire outside board members.
One of the unique features of the venture capital relationship is the role that the
investors play in structuring the management team. Hellmann (1998) provides the the-
oretical foundations to the empirical work by Hellmann and Puri (2002), who show that
venture capitalists play a substantial role in the professionalization of management teams.
See also Sahlman (1990). For our fourth dependent variable we therefore ask whether an
investor gets involved in recruiting management teams.
Finally, we are particularly interested in how venture capital ﬁrms can help in the
process of obtaining additional ﬁnancing from other ﬁnanciers. Our ﬁfth dependent vari-
able therefore asks whether an investor helped the ﬁrm with further fund-raising from
additional sources. This constitutes a new and alternative measure of venture capital
support.
3.2 Motivating the independent variables
Looking at specialization at the organizational level, the most important dimension is
whether a venture capital ﬁrm is independent or not. Independent ﬁrms can essentially
9deﬁne their own investment styles. By contrast, so-called ’captive’ venture capital ﬁrms–
those owned by a bank, a corporation, or the government–can be strongly aﬀected by
the strategic goals of their parent organization. The work of Gompers and Lerner (2000),
Hellmann (2002), Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2004)) already provide some evidence on
how captive venture capital ﬁrms behave diﬀerently than their independent counterparts.
In this paper we address an important unanswered question in this literature, namely
whether independent venture capital ﬁrms are more or less active investors. We can think
of independence as a form of specialization, in the sense that these ﬁrms are conceived as
separate entities, whose driving goal is to make a proﬁt from investing in venture capital.
We consider two other measures of the organizational specialization of venture capital
ﬁrms. First, we ask whether a ﬁrm specializes only in venture capital, or whether it invests
more broadly in other types of private equity deals, including mezzanine ﬁnance, leveraged
and management buy-outs (LBOs and MBOs). Our market focus measure identiﬁes those
ﬁrms which concentrate on a single form of intermediation. Second, we ask how much a
ﬁrm is willing to focus on a few companies rather than spreading its attention across a
larger number of deals. Our deal focus measure looks at how many partners are, on average,
available per company. Both of these variables measure the degree of specialization, one
at the level of the focus on a single type of ﬁnancing, the other at the more ﬁne-grained
l e v e lo fh o wt om a n a g et h eﬁrm’s deal ﬂow.
We also control for the age and size of venture capital ﬁrms. Looking at US data,
Gompers (1996) and Gompers and Lerner (1999b) suggest that the size and age of a venture
capital ﬁrm may be a proxy for its quality and reputation. In the European context, the
age of a venture capital ﬁrm also signals its vintage: older ﬁrms were founded at a time
when the European venture capital industry was still in its infant stages and investment
philosophies were considerably more conservative (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2004)).
Our regressions also include a number of company characteristics. We adopt a parsi-
monious speciﬁcation for the main model, and discuss several additions and extensions in
Section 5. We focus on two essential deal characteristics: industry and stage. Companies
which receive venture ﬁnance at an early stage are likely to beneﬁt to greater extent of
the involvement of the venture capital ﬁrm, which can help them mature, harness their
strategy, ﬁnd valuable managers and additional sources of ﬁnance. We also control for the
industry where a company operates since this might also aﬀect the likelihood of receiving
support from venture capital ﬁrms.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 4 reports the results for our model with measures of organizational specialization.
For each dependent variable we report in column (i) the estimated coeﬃcient and (below)
its t-ratio, while in column (ii) we report the marginal increase in probability implied
by the estimated coeﬃcients. In all our regressions we use Huber-White robust standard
errors. The number of observations diﬀers across regressions because of missing values for
some of the variables. We further discuss this in Section 6.
Table 4 shows that organizational specialization matters. First and foremost, it shows
that independent venture capital ﬁrms are much more involved with their companies than
captives. This is true for all ﬁve involvement measures. Being an independent venture
10ﬁrm thus strongly favors an active investment style.
Both the market focus and the deal focus variables also have a strong positive eﬀect
on most of the involvement variables. This says that ﬁrms that specialize on the venture
capital market, and ﬁrms that focus on ﬁnancing relatively few companies per partner,
provide more governance and support to their companies.
The regressions of Table 4 also control for some additional venture ﬁrm characteristics.
T h es i z eo ft h ev e n t u r ec a p i t a lﬁrm either is insigniﬁcant or it has a negative coeﬃcient,
suggesting that larger venture ﬁrms become less involved as investors. The venture ﬁrm’
age coeﬃcient is negative in the interaction and board seat regressions, but positive oth-
erwise. This suggests an interesting pattern, whereby older venture capital ﬁrms place
less emphasis on frequent interactions or board seats, but they are more active in hiring
directors, recruiting management, and fund-raising. This is consistent with older venture
ﬁrms relying less on formal governance mechanisms and providing a higher level of support
to their companies, with less need for frequent interaction.
Overall, the results from Table 4 provide clear evidence that the specialization of
ﬁnancial intermediaries is strongly related to an active investment style. Notably, these
eﬀects are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also economically large. For example,
across the ﬁve involvement measures, we ﬁnd that independent ﬁrms have between 15%
and 32% higher probabilities of being involved.
4T h e r o l e o f h u m a n c a p i t a l
4.1 Motivating the independent variables
Ultimately, ﬁnancial intermediation is performed by people. Hayek (1945, p.520) and
Becker (1993) both emphasize the importance of individuals acquiring speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
about a narrow range of problems, thus specializing their human capital. Yet, the literature
on ﬁnancial intermediation essentially ignores human capital (see, e.g., Greenbaum and
Thakor (1995) and Freixas and Rochet (1997)).7
We consider three distinct measures of human capital specialization. First, we look
at a partner’s experience in venture capital, as measured by the number of years that
s/he has worked in the venture capital industry. The natural conjecture is that having
more experience improves a partner’s ability to perform his/her tasks. Second, we look at
whether before becoming a venture capitalist, the individual had some business experience,
be it by working in industry, consulting, or as an entrepreneur. Prior business experience
might help a partner to better understand the challenges of portfolio companies, providing
a measure of the partner’s specialized experience in handling business problems. Third, we
look at whether a partner has an education in science or technology. Science specialization
may give a partner a better and deeper knowledge which can facilitate the appreciation of
the technological and operational challenges of the companies s/he is in charge of.
7It is interesting to note practitioners consider the venture capitalists’ human capital of central impor-
tance. When the business press reports on venture capital, it regularly comments on the importance of
individual partners and the importance of having the right background. Also, the web pages of venture
capital ﬁrms typically introduce their ﬁrm by talking about their partners’ backgrounds.
114.2 The main eﬀects
Table 5 shows the results for our model with human capital, which uses only human
capital variables and company characteristics. Table 6 presents the results of our full
model, where we consider both organizational specialization and human capital variables.
The two tables show very similar results.
The main result is that human capital seems to be an important driver for how active
venture capitalists are. The most important human capital factor is prior business experi-
ence, which has a consistently positive, large and signiﬁcant eﬀect on all the involvement
variables. This result conﬁrms the notion that business expertise is important for prac-
ticing an active investment style. Having more experience in venture tends to also have
a positive eﬀect on involvement, but the eﬀects are much weaker. Scientist partners get
more involved in recruiting management and sitting on boards. However, they spend less
time interacting with their companies.
Apart from being statistically signiﬁcant, the eﬀect of human capital also has a large
economic impact. For instance, the probability of involvement increases between 16% and
47% if the venture partners marginally increase their business experience above the sample
mean.
Comparing Tables 5 and 6 allow us to examine how organizational and human cap-
ital factors interact. One extreme view is that organizational structure does not matter
by itself, and that investment styles are entirely deﬁn e db yt h es p e c i a l i z e ds k i l l so fm a n -
agers (i.e., partners, in the context of venture capital). If this were true, we should ﬁnd
organizational variables to loose their signiﬁcance once we control for partners’ human
capital. An intermediate view is that human capital operates on top of any organizational
structure. In this case, we would expect human capital variables to provide additional ex-
planatory power, without aﬀecting the base eﬀect of organizational structure. The other
extreme view is that human capital doesn’t matter at all. In this case, human capital vari-
ables would be insigniﬁc a n t .T h i si se ﬀectively what most of the ﬁnancial intermediation
literature implicitly assumes.
The results from Tables 5 and 6 show that human capital matters, and that adding
human capital hardly aﬀects the signiﬁcance of organizational variables. This rejects either
of the extreme positions, and favors the intermediate view. To further explore this pattern
of interactions we also looked at the selection of partners into venture ﬁrms. In unreported
regressions, we switched our unit of analysis and considered the data on individual venture
capital partners. We looked at how human capital traits are related to diﬀerent venture
ﬁrms, but found relatively little correlation.8 Selection of partners into venture capital
ﬁrms therefore does not appear to be the driving force behind the eﬀects of human capital
on active involvement.
4.3 Do individual partners-in-charge matter?
So far we have shown that human capital matters. We now ask exactly whose human
capital matters, and at what level. Is it that human capital matters because every partner
8The strongest eﬀects concerned the age of venture capital ﬁrms, with older venture capital ﬁrms
attracting more partners with experience and science.
12is unique? This would suggest that human capital should matter at the level of individual
partners. Or is it that human capital matters because it contributes to deﬁne venture
ﬁrms’ own identity? This would suggest that human capital should matter mostly at
the level of ﬁrms. Put diﬀerently, does the eﬀect of human capital stem mainly from
across-ﬁrm or within-ﬁrm variation?
To address this interesting question, we leverage the fact that when companies obtain
funding, they will typically interact with only one or a few of the ﬁrm’s partners. A unique
strength of our data is that we can observe which partners are in charge of which deals.
We have this data for many but not all our deals, so that we loose about 20% of our
observations by going down to the level of the partners-in-charge. As before, we construct
three human capital variables, but now we take averages only across the partners-in-
charge instead of across all the venture ﬁrm’s partners. Not surprisingly, the ﬁrm-level
and partners—in-charge-level human capital variables are highly correlated. Since we want
to see whether there is any additional information that stems from the heterogeneity at
the level of the partners-in-charge, we use the diﬀerence between the partners-in-charge
level and ﬁrm-level human capital variables. These diﬀerence measures are no longer
correlated with the ﬁrm-level human capital variables. We label our diﬀerence variables
at the partner level with the P-preﬁx.
We then use two approaches to estimate the eﬀects of partners-in-charge. Table 7
reports the results from including the partners-in-charge variables into the main model
from Table 6. Table 8 uses a conditional logit model, based on Chamberlain (1980), where
the only variation that is used for the estimation is within-ﬁrm variation.9 By construction,
the conditional logit drops all observations when there is no within-ﬁrm variation, leaving
us with a lower number of observations.
While Tables 7 and 8 use diﬀerent estimation approaches, they show a consistent
pattern of results. The overall eﬀect of the partners-in-charge is relatively small. Most
coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant. The most important variable at the partner
level is venture experience: More venture experience by individual partners has a positive
eﬀect on the involvement variables. While we noted before that venture experience does
not matter much at the ﬁrm level, we now ﬁnd that individual partners leverage greater
venture experience to get more involved with their portfolio companies.
Overall, Tables 7 and 8 provide consistent evidence that the specialization of human
capital is an important determinant of the behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
5 Further thoughts
In this section we further probe into our main result that organizational specialization
and human capital are key drivers of investment styles, and provide a number of model
extension.
9This essentially amounts to using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Indeed, we also reran all of our conditional logit
models as linear probability models with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, and found analogous results.
135.1 The role of syndication
Investors may assume diﬀerent attitudes toward involvement depending on the role they
play in a company. Syndication may thus aﬀect the degree of investor activism. Being part
of a syndicate may dilute individual incentives, leading to a potential free-rider problem
(Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)). A syndicate leader, on the other hand, typically assumes
great responsibility and may also have a reputation at stake, suggesting more involvement
(Brander, Antweiler, and Amit (2002), Lerner (1994)). We consider how syndication
aﬀects involvement decisions. We include two additional variables, one for whether a deal
is syndicated, and one for whether the investor is the lead syndicator. Table 9 reports the
results, suggesting three main insights. First, syndication is associated with lower levels of
involvement. Second, leading a syndicate has a positive eﬀect on the involvement variables.
Third, adding the syndication variables barely aﬀects all other coeﬃcients, particularly
those of our measure of specialization. This conﬁrms that our main results are not driven
by the presence of syndication or by the role of syndicate leader.
5.2 Are captive venture ﬁrms all alike?
Our analysis ﬁnds strong diﬀerences in the behavior between independent and captive
venture capital ﬁrms. A natural question to ask is whether captive ﬁrms are all alike,
or whether there are any important diﬀerences among them. We thus break out captive
venture ﬁrms into bank, corporate, and public venture capital ﬁrms. For this, we need to
make independent venture ﬁrms the default category. Table 10 shows that bank, corporate
and public venture ﬁrms all have a negative eﬀect on the involvement variables.10 Virtually
all the coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant. Corporate venture ﬁrms tend to have slightly
smaller negative (and statistically less signiﬁcant) coeﬃcients, suggesting that bank and
public venture ﬁrms are the least involved.
The fact that public venture capital is consistently less active than independent venture
ﬁrms suggests a more cautious approach on part of those policy-makers who try to favor
the creation of national venture capital industries through direct public involvement. As
argued by Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli (2004), public money is probably better spent
in ensuring adequate conditions for the development of a private venture capital industry.
5.3 Depth of involvement
Hellmann and Puri (2002) note that when venture capitalists support the professionaliza-
tion of their companies, they are not only concerned with recruiting chief executive oﬃcers
(CEOs), but also become involved more deeply with building an entire management team.
Our survey therefore asked additional detail about the role of venture capitalists in re-
cruiting. Table 11 reports additional probit regressions, where the dependent variables
are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if an investor reported to have helped
the company with recruiting (respectively) the CEO, the chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer (CFO), a
vice-president of marketing, the head of R&D, or another executive. Our results on orga-
nizational specialization and human capital continue to hold for all of these more detailed
10Remember that a positive coeﬃcient for independent ﬁrms is the same as a negative coeﬃcient for
captive ﬁrms.
14recruitment variables. These results conﬁrm that more focussed venture capitalists whose
partners have more business experience are involved with recruiting irrespective of the
particular position in the management team.
5.4 Additional deal characteristics
We want to investigate whether the model we employ adequately controls for the het-
erogeneity of venture deals. Because each additional company-level variable reduces the
number of observations, we prefer to keep our base model parsimonious. We now discuss
how adding further company-level variables does not aﬀect our main results.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) note that the size of an investor’s equity stake aﬀects its
incentive to be involved with the company. While we do not have data on equity stakes,
we do have some data on the amount of money invested, on the basis that it is likely
that investing larger amounts of money is correlated with larger ownership stakes. We use
two variables. First, we consider the total amount of money that a venture capital ﬁrm
invests in the deal. Second, we consider what percentage of the total ﬁnancing raised by
the company in the round is provided by our investor. The absolute amount invested has
a positive eﬀect on the involvement variables. The percentage of the ﬁnancing provided
by a venture capital ﬁrm has little explanatory power. Again, we ﬁnd that including these
additional variables does not aﬀect our main results.
Another concern might be that our sample period includes the ’dotcom’ period. The
dotcom bubble was smaller in Europe than in the US. Nonetheless we ask whether time
periods aﬀect our results. We add a set of time dummies, one for each sample year, to
measure when a deal was completed, but we ﬁnd that they do not aﬀect our results. We
also reran all of our regressions dropping all deals that were classiﬁed as “Software and
internet” and found that this did not aﬀect our results either.
In our model involvement depends on the stage of the company. In addition to control-
ling for stage, we can also control for the age of the company when the deal was completed.
Again, this does not aﬀect the results.
Our data covers a total of seventeen diﬀerent countries. In a companion paper we
investigate the importance of country eﬀects on venture capital investing (Bottazzi, Da
Rin, and Hellmann (2004)). For this paper, we consider two simple extensions. We group
countries by legal origin (LaPorta et. al.(1998)), both using a company’s and an investor’s
legal system of origin. And we reran our regressions using individual country dummies.
In all of these regressions, we ﬁnd that our results are not materially aﬀected by these
additional controls.
6 Robustness of results
6.1 Endogeneity
To begin with, we want to clarify issues of endogeneity. We do not have any statistical
endogeneity problem, in the sense that our left-hand side variables would directly cause
right-hand side variables. For example, helping with recruiting cannot increase a partner’s
prior business experience. Endogeneity thus concerns the interpretation of our estimated
15coeﬃcients. Our main objective is to establish equilibrium patterns. This is conceptually
diﬀerent from making strong statements about speciﬁc causal links, which we don’t claim
to do. For example, when we observe a correlation between recruiting and independent
venture ﬁrms, this establishes that, in equilibrium, independent venture ﬁrms provide
more help with recruiting. This is consistent with the notion that such ﬁrms are better at
providing such help. But it does not exclude selection eﬀects, where companies that want
more help with recruiting, seek out independent venture ﬁrms. Either outcome constitutes
an economically meaningful equilibrium pattern. Establishing these equilibrium patterns
is the explicit goal of this paper.
Naturally, and as an additional step, one can try to decompose treatment and selec-
tion eﬀects, estimating a simultaneous equation model (Heckman (1976)). We focus on
the choice between independent and captive venture capital ﬁrms. This is the most visible
selection criterion for entrepreneurs. And our analysis shows that it has the biggest im-
pact on the involvement outcomes. For the simultaneous equation model our base Probit
models represent the treatment equations. We augment these with a selection equation to
determine what kind of ﬁrms select independent venture ﬁrms. The independent variables
for this are the company characteristics, namely industry and stage. To properly identify
the system we want an additional independent variable that inﬂuences selection, but not
outcomes. We propose to use the fraction of deals made by independent venture capital
ﬁr m si nt h ec o m p a n y ’ sc o u n t r y .W en a m et h i sv ariable VCINDE-SHARE. It is useful for
identiﬁcation, since, one the one hand, one would expect it to aﬀect selection: a higher
fraction represents a greater supply of independent venture ﬁrms, which makes it more
likely for any one company to choose an independent venture ﬁrm. On the other hand,
one would think that this fraction should not have any eﬀect on the on-going involvement
that a speciﬁc investor has with the speciﬁcc o m p a n y .
Table 12 reports the results from the simultaneous equation models. Accounting for
selection does not change the fundamental insights of the main analysis. The coeﬃcients
for independent venture ﬁrms remain large and statistically signiﬁcant in all the outcome
regression. In fact, adding the selection equation hardly aﬀects the main model at all.
Interestingly, the estimates for ρ, which capture the strength of selection on unobservable
characteristics, are mostly insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the selection equations does
not interfere much with the treatment equations. Finally, we note that the system is well
identiﬁed, in that the fraction of independent venture ﬁr m si ss i g n i ﬁcant with the expected
sign.
6.2 Sample and measurement issues
We already discussed that our sample is unprecedentedly large, and that it closely matches
population characteristics. As with any other hand-collected data, and in spite of a major
eﬀort to ﬁll as many gaps as possible, we still end up with some missing observations
on some variables. To verify that our data do not suﬀer from sample selectivity bias we
perform several additional tests. First, we estimate a Heckman sample selection model,
using the maximum likelihood approach. In the ﬁr s ts t e pa no r d i n a r yP r o b i tm o d e li s
used to obtain consistent estimates of the sample selection equation. We ﬁnd no strong
patterns among the missing observations. Still, we estimate the second step, to verify that
16there is no correlation between the selection equation and our main regressions. None of
our regressions appear to be aﬀected by this, suggesting that it is unlikely that our results
are aﬀected by sample selection problems.
As a further check on sample selectivity bias, we run our regressions on a sample
restricted to those deals for which we have complete information. We ﬁnd that our results
are qualitatively unaﬀected.
Another sample-related concern might be that within our sample we have multiple
deals made by the same investor. One may argue that these observations are not fully
independent, and one might consider clustering standard errors. (This actually imposes a
fairly strong assumption too, namely that all deals by the same investor have a common
error structure). As one would expect, clustering tends to increase standard errors. This
occasionally reduces the statistical signiﬁcance of an individual coeﬃcient, but does not
aﬀect the overall pattern of our results.
To measure human capital, we have considered average partner proﬁles. If, for example,
half the partners in a ﬁrm have a science education, the value for science education is 0.5.
To be sure that the results are not driven by this measurement approach, we consider
an alternative way of measuring human capital. It might be that all that matters is
whether one partner has a science education: others would beneﬁtf r o mt h a tp a r t n e r ’ s
specialized knowledge. To address this possibility we consider using ’maximal’ instead
of ’average’ proﬁles. This means taking the highest value across partners for all human
capital measures. In the above example, the value for science education would be 1. We
ﬁnd that using maximal proﬁles does not change the results. It thus appears that the
results are robust to alternative ways of measuring human capital.
To construct our INTERACTION variable we pooled weekly and monthly interactions,
and we pooled quarterly and annual interactions. We want to make full use of the infor-
mation we have, and be sure that pooling has no eﬀect on our results. To this purpose
we estimate ordered probit models with the disaggregated information, where the depen-
dent variable is an ordered categorical variable for annual, quarterly, monthly, or weekly
interactions. We found that pooling did not aﬀect any of our results.
Similarly, to construct our EARLY STAGE variable, we pooled seed and early stage,
and we pooled expansion and bridge stage. We reran all of our regressions using the
variable STAGE, where we add four independent dummy variables, which take the value
1 if a deal is reported as seed, start-up, expansion or bridge, respectively. We ﬁnd that
pooling stage information did not aﬀect any of our results.
7C o n c l u s i o n
What makes ﬁnancial intermediaries more or less active investors? In this paper we use
data on venture capital to examine investor heterogeneity, and how it aﬀects investment
styles. Our ﬁndings suggest a fundamental economic force that has been largely ignored:
specialization. Specialization matters at the level of ﬁrm: independent venture capital
ﬁrms and ﬁrms that are focussed purely on venture capital have more active investment
styles. We also document the relevance of specialization at the level of human capital:
venture ﬁrms whose partners have prior business experience and a scientiﬁc education are
17also more active investors.
These results have several important implications for the theory of ﬁnancial interme-
diation. For one, this literature has largely ignored forces of specialization. It is curious to
note that corporate ﬁnance scholars have been advocating the beneﬁts of focus and special-
ization in the large and growing literature on conglomerate discounts. Yet they have been
reluctant to take their own medicine, and apply the same logic to ﬁnancial intermediation
itself. This paper focuses on venture capital as one type of ﬁnancial intermediation, but
future research might want to extend this kind of analysis to other ﬁnancial intermediaries
too.
This paper also hopes to bring human capital to the forefront of ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion research. Theories of intermediation typically assume homogenous agents, eﬀectively
abstracting away from human capital. Yet, if we take Stein’s emphasis on the process-
ing of soft information serious, we recognize that diﬀerences in ability are likely to be an
important determinant of the process of ﬁnancial intermediation. We thus hope that our
ﬁndings will provide a broader impetus for looking at the role of human capital in ﬁnancial
intermediation.
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22Table 1: Sample properties
This table compares our sample to the population it is drawn from. Panel A looks at the country composition
and response rates, Panel B at the composition by venture ﬁrm type, Panel C at the size composition, and
Panel D at the age composition. Variables are deﬁned in Table 2. Partners are measured in units, the
amount managed in million of current euros, and age in months in December 2001.
Panel A: COUNTRY COMPOSITION AND RESPONSE RATE
POPULATION SAMPLE RESPONSE RATE
Austria 23 8 34.8%
Belgium 34 5 14.7%
Denmark 29 4 13.8%
Finland 33 6 18.2%
France 101 15 14.9%
Germany 146 19 13.0%
Greece 8 4 50.0%
Ireland 15 3 20.0%
Italy 37 6 16.2%
Luxembourg 3 1 33.3%
The Netherlands 52 5 9.6%
Norway 22 2 9.1%
Portugal 10 2 20.0%
Spain 38 10 26.3%
Sweden 17 6 35.3%
Switzerland 43 6 14.0%
UK 139 22 15.8%
TOTAL 750 124 16.5%






Panel C: COMPOSITION BY SIZE
POPULATION
Mean Median Min. Max.
Partners 4.3 3 1 25
Amount managed 333.4 60 1 14,200
SAMPLE
Mean Median Min. Max.
Partners 4.2 3 1 20
Amount managed 179.8 52 2 4,500Table 2(a): Dependent variables
Variable Description
INTERACTION dummy variable that takes the values 1 if the venture ﬁrm interacts with the
portfolio company monthly or weekly; 0 if it interacts annualy or quarterly.
BOARD SEAT dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist is reported to
sit on the board of directors of the company; 0 otherwise.
BOARD HIRE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist is reported to
be involved in the hiring of the company’s outside directors; 0 otherwise.
RECRUITING dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist is reported to
be involved in recruiting senior management for the company; 0 otherwise.
FUNDRAISING dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist is reported to
be involved with helping the company obtain additional ﬁnancing from other
sources; 0 otherwise.
Table 2(b): Organizational variables
Variable Description
INDEPENDENTVC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture ﬁrm deﬁn e si t s e l fa sa n
independent venture ﬁrm; 0 otherwise.
BANKVC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture ﬁrm deﬁnes itself as
bank-aﬃliated venture ﬁrm; 0 otherwise.
CORPORATEVC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture ﬁrm deﬁnes itself as a
corporate venture ﬁrm; 0 otherwise.
PUBLICVC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture ﬁrm is aﬃliated to gov-
ernment; 0 otherwise.
CAPTIVEVC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture ﬁrm is a BANKVC,
CORPORATEVC or PUBLICVC; 0 otherwise.
VC-SIZE is the amount under management at the venture ﬁrm.
VC-AGE is the age of the venture capital ﬁr m ,m e a s u r e di nm o n t h sa tt h ee n do ft h e
sample period.
MARKET FOCUS dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the venture ﬁrm is reported to invest
also in non-venture private equity; 1 otherwise.
DEAL FOCUS is the number of partners of the venture ﬁrm divided by its average yearly
number of deals.Table 2(c): Human Capital variables
Variable Description
VENTURE-EXPERIENCE is the average number of years of experience as venture capitalists by the
venture ﬁrm’s partners.
BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE is the share of a venture ﬁrm’s partners reported to have a professional
background of working in industry or consulting.
SCIENCE-EDUCATION is the share of a venture ﬁrm’s partners reported to have an education
in science or engineering.
P-VENTURE-EXPERIENCE is the diﬀerence between the years of experience in the venture capi-
tal industry by the partner(s)-in-charge of a company and VENTURE-
EXPERIENCE
P-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE is the diﬀerence between the share of partner(s)-in-charge of a portfo-
lio company reported to have a professional background of working in
industry or consulting and BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE.
P-SCIENCE-EDUCATION is the diﬀerence between share of partner(s)-in-charge of a portfolio
company reported to have an education in science or engineering and
SCIENCE-EDUCATION.
Table 2(d): Company-level variables
Variable Description
INDUSTRY set of a dummy variables which assign each company to one of the fol-
lowing industries: Biotech and pharma; Medical products; Software and
internet; Financial services; Industrial services; Electronics; Consumer
services; Telecom; Food and consumer goods; Industrial products (incl.
energy); Media & Entertainment; Other.
EARLY STAGE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a deal is reported as a seed or
start-up, and 0 if it is reported as expansion, or bridge.
SYNDICATE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is syndicated; 0 oth-
erwise.
SYNDICATE LEAD dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture ﬁrm is leading the
syndicated deal.Table 3: Descriptive statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for all our dependent and independent variables. The deﬁnition
of each variable is found in Table 2. For dummy variables the MEAN column reports the frequency of
observations.
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX OBS
Interaction 0.693 - 0 1 1,457
Board Seat 0.660 - 0 1 1,608
Board Hire 0.408 - 0 1 1,514
Recruiting 0.484 - 0 1 1,538
Fundraising 0.524 - 0 1 1,471
IndependentVC 0.594 - 0 1 1,643
BankVC 0.217 - 0 1 1,643
CorporateVC 0.088 - 0 1 1,643
PublicVC 0.099 - 0 1 1,643
CaptiveVC 0.406 - 0 1 1,643
VC-Size 258 109 1 4,500 1,631
VC-Age 93 54 12 390 1,643
Market Focus 0.557 - 0 1 1,643
Deal Focus 0.942 0.942 0.082 8 1,642
Venture-Experience 6.549 5.857 0 20.334 1,618
Business-Experience 0.584 - 0 1 1,633
Science-Education 0.378 - 0 1 1,633
P-Venture-Experience 0.643 0 -11.667 17.875 1,578
P-Business-Experience 0.004 0 -1 0.8 1,592
P-Science-Education -0.014 0 -0.875 0.834 1,582
Early Stage 0.596 - 0 1 1,431
Syndicate 0.679 - 0 1 1,390
Syndicate Lead 0.582 - 0 1 1,271
Biotech and pharma 0.141 - 0 1 1,623
Medical products 0.073 - 0 1 1,623
Software and Internet 0.305 - 0 1 1,623
Financial services 0.017 - 0 1 1,623
Industrial services 0.052 - 0 1 1,623
Electronics 0.069 - 0 1 1,623
Telecom 0.083 - 0 1 1,623
Consumer services 0.020 - 0 1 1,623
Food and consumer goods 0.037 - 0 1 1,623
Industrial products 0.111 - 0 1 1,623
Media & entertainment 0.036 - 0 1 1,623






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The European Corporate Governance Institute has been established to improve corpo-
rate governance through fostering independent scientific research and related activities.
The ECGI will produce and disseminate high quality research while remaining close to 
the concerns and interests of corporate, financial and public policy makers. It will draw on 
the expertise of scholars from numerous countries and bring together a critical mass of 
expertise and interest to bear on this important subject.
The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI 
or its members. 
www.ecgi.orgECGI Working Paper Series in Finance
Editorial Board
Editor                               Paolo Fulghieri, Professor of Finance, University of North          
                                     Carolina, INSEAD & CEPR
Consulting Editors           Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance, Professor of  
                                         Economics, The Wharton School of the University of    
                                         Pennsylvania
                                         Patrick Bolton, John H. Scully ‘66 Professor of Finance and  
                                         Economics, Princeton University, ECGI & CEPR
                                         Marco Pagano, Professor of Economics, Università di Salerno,  
                                         ECGI & CEPR
                                         Luigi Zingales, Robert C. McCormack Professor of    
                                         Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago & CEPR
                                         Julian Franks, Corporation of London Professor of Finance,  
                                         London Business School & CEPR
                                         Xavier Vives, Professor of Economics and Finance,               
                                         INSEAD & CEPR
Editorial Assistant :          Cristina Vespro, ECARES, Université Libre De Bruxelles
Financial assistance for the services of the editorial assistant of these series is provided 
by the European Commission through its RTN Programme on Understanding Financial 
Architecture: Legal and Political Frameworks and Economic Efficiency (Contract no. 
HPRN-CT-2000-00064).
www.ecgi.org\wpElectronic Access to the Working Paper Series
The full set of ECGI working papers can be accessed through the Institute’s Web-site 
(www.ecgi.org/wp) or SSRN:
Finance Paper Series     http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Fin.html 
Law Paper Series             http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Law.html 
www.ecgi.org\wp